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Chicago Tribune  
July 11, 2004

**Rice: Rewards For Nuclear Arms Deal**

By Tribune news services

SEOUL, SOUTH KOREA -- U.S. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice said Friday that North Korea could reap "surprise" rewards if it dismantles its atomic weapons program, as she capped an Asian tour focused on easing the nuclear standoff.

In Seoul after stops in Japan and China, Rice also thanked South Korea for sticking to its planned troop dispatch to Iraq despite the beheading of a South Korean hostage on June 22.

Speaking with South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki Moon, Rice said, "North Korea will be surprised to see how much will be possible" if the communist nation agrees to abandon its nuclear ambitions, South Korea's Yonhap news agency reported.

She cited the example of Libya, which gave up its nuclear weapons program, helping pave the way for last month's resumption of diplomatic ties between Tripoli and Washington.

<http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/chi-0407110198jul11,1,736949.story>

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Chicago Tribune  
July 10, 2004

## U.S. Firm Linked To Nuclear Sales

By Associated Press

VIENNA, Austria -- More than 20 firms -- including at least one American company -- have illegally supplied nations seeking nuclear arms, marking the first time a U.S. company has been linked to the black market network. International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, who is heading a probe into the illicit sales, avoided specifics on the locations of the companies in an interview with The Associated Press on Friday. But a senior diplomat said at least one was in the United States -- the first time in five months of investigations by the UN nuclear agency that an American company has been implicated in the black market network headed by Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan.

The diplomat, who did not name any of the companies, said Syria and Saudi Arabia were being investigated as possible buyers, in addition to Iraq, Iran, Libya and North Korea -- countries already known to have bought from or been in contact with the clandestine network.

The diplomat, who spoke on condition of anonymity, told the AP that beyond suspicions prompting a continuing investigation, "there has been no proof" that would warrant Syria and Saudi Arabia being reported to the IAEA. Syria has been cited by the United States as trying to acquire the technology to make nuclear weapons, including centrifuges needed to enrich uranium, a charge Damascus denies.

Saudi Arabia has denied news reports that it agreed to supply Pakistan with oil in exchange for nuclear know-how as a hedge against fears that Iran was developing nuclear weapons.

Israel has good intelligence on its neighbors, but does not appear to consider Syria or the Saudis the primary nuclear threat in the region. During ElBaradei's visit to Israel, which ended Thursday, officials repeatedly expressed concern about Iran's nuclear ambitions, but did not mention the other two countries, according to officials familiar with the discussions in Jerusalem.

ElBaradei's route to Israel had been kept confidential by the agency. But he confirmed Friday that he had arrived from Dubai, a major shipping and supply point used by the Khan network for clients in the Middle East and possibly some African nations.

ElBaradei said he had talked to the defense, police and foreign ministers of the United Arab Emirates on ways to block ports and other transport routes for illicit nuclear shipments.

"We will help them with updating security in the Emirates," ElBaradei said without elaboration.

Of the companies that have supplied the nuclear black market, he would give no details beyond saying they were in "over 20 countries, some of them in North America."

The diplomat said ElBaradei also pressed for direct access to some of the Khan middlemen who had worked out of Dubai.

ElBaradei said his agency's investigations had revealed no operations similar to the one run by Khan. "From what we have seen so far, it was all under his oversight," the UN nuclear agency chief said.

<http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/chi-0407100079jul10,1,6967466.story>

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Washington Post

July 13, 2004

Pg. 12

## Skepticism About Defector's Weapons Allegations Ignored

By Walter Pincus, Washington Post Staff Writer

A Defense Intelligence Agency official warned the CIA about the questionable reliability of an Iraqi defector who was the chief source of allegations that Saddam Hussein had mobile facilities for making biological weapons, but his information was included in the official prewar intelligence estimate anyway, according to the report released last week by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

The defector, who was initially debriefed by the German Federal Intelligence Service (BND) in 2000, was described in early U.S. intelligence reports as a project engineer involved in designing and helping construct biological facilities in Iraq. Before the war, the Bush administration cited the allegation that Iraq possessed the mobile weapons facilities as a vivid reflection of the threat posed by Hussein. No evidence that the labs existed has been found since the invasion.

The Iraqi defector was listed as a "credible source" for the information on Iraq's bioweapons fleet in the CIA's October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate, even though only U.S. intelligence analysts had ever interviewed him. That interview took place in May 2000, when a DIA employee met with the man -- later given the code name "Curve Ball" -- to arrange for his helping the United States, according to the Senate report.

At that morning meeting, the defector was "having a terrible hangover," which raised questions about his reliability, according to the Senate report, which detailed deep flaws and exaggerations in the CIA's prewar intelligence reporting on Iraq.

In late 2002, the report said, the DIA official pressed a Western European intelligence agency -- identified by officials as the German BND -- for direct access again to the defector, but was told by his European counterparts that they now had misgivings about him. The DIA official was told that an interview "was not possible" because the Germans "were having major handling issues with him and were attempting to determine if, in fact, Curve Ball was who he said he was." German officials, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said recently that they are still reviewing the defector's credentials.

The DIA employee conveyed his skepticism of the defector's information and the German government's misgivings before the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate, the Senate report said. But his assessment did not seem to have much impact. Another intelligence officer, working for the Defense HUMINT (human intelligence) Service, was responsible for collecting and reporting information on the defector's statements, but "did not recall the particular evaluation provided by the DIA analysts," according to the Senate report.

U.S. intelligence officials finally interviewed the defector in recent months and "are continuing to question his reliability, although he has been convincing that he did have access to different levels" of Iraq's biological weapons program, a senior administration official said yesterday.

One analyst pointed out to the committee staff that translations of what the Iraqi told his German interrogators may have "led to some misunderstandings." The defector spoke English and Arabic, which was translated into German and then back into English.

The DIA employee who had interviewed the defector in 2000 expressed frustration that his concerns were not taken more seriously, the Senate report indicates.

Just days before Secretary of State Colin L. Powell's Feb. 5, 2003, address to the U.N. Security Council, the DIA employee saw a draft of Powell's speech, which, as delivered, cited "firsthand descriptions" of a mobile bioweapons fleet from an Iraqi engineer who had defected.

The DIA employee, who was assigned to CIA headquarters, told his CIA superior that he questioned the "validity of the information" and that it warranted "further inquiry before we use the information as the backbone of one of our major findings for the existence of a continuing Iraqi BW [bioweapons] program!"

He also e-mailed the deputy chief of the CIA's Iraq task force. Both officials said they were already aware of his concerns, the Senate report said.

The deputy chief e-mailed him back: "Let's keep in mind the fact that this war's going to happen regardless of what Curve Ball said or didn't say, and that the Powers That Be probably aren't terribly interested in whether Curve Ball knows what he's talking about. However, in the interest of Truth, we owe somebody a sentence or two of warning, if you honestly have reservations."

The deputy chief later told the Senate committee staff that the DIA employee was a personal friend and that "what I was probably trying to do was to calm him down a bit. . . . The war is not going to hinge on what [he] thinks about Curve Ball."

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A45200-2004Jul12.html>

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(Editor's Note: Hyperlink for referenced report and conclusions follows article.)

New York Times

July 13, 2004

## **Doubts On Informant Deleted In Senate Text**

By Douglas Jehl

WASHINGTON, July 12 - Among the passages deleted from the public version of the Senate Intelligence Committee's report on Iraq is a detailed assessment that casts doubt on the credibility of an Iraqi defector whose claims about Iraq's mobile biological weapons laboratories have been discredited, according to government officials. His name was kept secret because he is still working for British intelligence, they said.

About one-fifth of the 511-page report still has not been made public, despite objections from both Republican and Democratic senators. As in the case of the Iraqi defector, the deletions were the result of objections raised by American intelligence agencies in the interest of protecting sources and methods, sometimes in deference to a foreign intelligence service, according to American government officials who have read the classified version of the Senate committee's report.

In the classified version of the report, the officials said, nearly three pages are devoted to questioning the credibility of the defector, who was one of four human sources cited last year by Secretary of State Colin L. Powell in a speech

to the United Nations as having provided crucial information about Iraq's mobile laboratories. But in the public version of the report, released Friday, all but one paragraph in those pages is blacked out.

The defector, known to the Central Intelligence Agency as Red River, failed a polygraph examination, the American officials said. But they said crucial information about the source had been deleted from the report in deference to British intelligence, which originally relayed the information provided by the defector to the United States and has maintained a continuing relationship with him.

On the mobile laboratories, the public version of the report includes a detailed indictment of the American agencies' reliance on one central source, known as Curveball, who was introduced to German intelligence by Ahmad Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress, and some information about a second source, who was introduced to the Defense Intelligence Agency by the I.N.C. and eventually labeled a fabricator by the D.I.A.

But in the public version, references to the other two sources - Red River and another whose code name included the word Red - are blacked out even in the table of contents. The only information about the source known as Red River is an apparent reference to the failed polygraph test, which notes that the intelligence committee staff has asked a polygraph expert from the Department of Defense "about the possibility of a 'false positive' " resulting from a polygraph examination.

The source known as Red was identified only in one paragraph of the report, which is partly blacked out, according to one government official. The public version of the report does not say whether he, too, was introduced by the I.N.C., but it notes that his only claim about mobile biological weapons laboratories was spelled out in a June 2001 report.

In the same e-mail message sent to a Central Intelligence Agency official shortly before Mr. Powell gave the speech citing the defector's account, an American intelligence official working with the Defense Department, who had questioned Curveball's credibility, did the same with Red, the report shows. The official noted that the source was "one whose reliability nor reporting has been valued" and that the reporting had "inconsistencies that need further checking," the report said.

Among other material deleted from the report, government officials said, were details of covert actions undertaken by American intelligence agencies to gather information about Iraq and to disrupt suspicious shipments to it, including aluminum tubes.

But the deletions also included material that appears to have been much more benign, including single words, which in at least one case could have referred only to the gender of a C.I.A. official not identified in the report.

The public version of the report contained much more information than the C.I.A. had initially been willing to approve for release, according to Senator Pat Roberts of Kansas, the Republican chairman of the committee. In early June, the agency had approved for release only about half of the document, Mr. Roberts said last week, and relented only after long negotiations with the committee staff.

Mr. Roberts and Senator John D. Rockefeller IV of West Virginia, the top Democrat on the panel, have said they will continue to press the C.I.A. to agree to the release of more of the document, adding that they still believe that more information could be released without harm to American national security.

Government officials who took part in the negotiations described a process in which representatives of the C.I.A. and the National Security Agency in particular raised the most objections to release of material contained in the classified version of the report. Those agencies were primarily seeking to protect information about the sources and methods of their intelligence-gathering activities, involving both human and technical intelligence.

The officials said that the C.I.A. was also protective of its relationships with foreign intelligence services, including those of Britain, Germany and Jordan, which provided much of the human intelligence on Iraq and its supposed illicit weapons. None of those intelligence services is mentioned in the Senate report, which takes American intelligence agencies to task for their reliance on foreign governments in providing sources of human intelligence on Iraq and illicit weapons.

"While these sources had the potential to provide some valuable information, they had a limited ability to provide the kind of detailed intelligence about current Iraqi weapons of mass destruction efforts sought by U.S.

policymakers," the report said. "Moreover, because the intelligence community did not have direct access to many of these sources, their credibility was difficult to assess and was often left to the foreign government services to judge."

<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/13/politics/13reda.html>

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## **REPORT ON THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S PREWAR INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS ON IRAQ**

Order Reported on July 7, 2004  
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE  
UNITED STATES SENATE  
<http://intelligence.senate.gov/iraqreport2.pdf>

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